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The changing role of household projections: exploring policy conflict and 
ambiguity in planning for housing 
Neil Harris, Brian Webb and Robert Smith 
School of Geography and Planning, Cardiff University 
 
Abstract 
Household projections have been a critical tool in establishing top-down hierarchical frameworks 
through which planning systems impose new housing requirements on localities. This paper re-
assesses the role of household projections in the context of two recent factors. The first is the 
emergence of increasingly localised spatial governance arrangements that enhance the scope to 
challenge household projections data. The second is the gradual emergence of the economy from 
recession and its impact on interpretation of household projections data. A case study of planning for 
housing in Wales explores the ambiguities and conflicts that arise as a result of these changes. 
 
Introduction 
Planning plays an important role in 'governing growth', particularly for housing (Murdoch and Abram, 
2002). Household change and plaŶŶiŶg͛s ƌole in shaping additional housing supply remain central 
concerns in the United Kingdom, continental Europe, the United States, and Australasia (Barker, 2014; 
Bramley, 2013; Gurran and Phibbs, 2013; Schwartz, 2015). In these countries, central governments 
use established tools for ensuring that planning systems support housing delivery. In the United 
Kingdom, planning for housing has been characterised by top-down and centralised direction, 
contrasting with wider decentralising and deregulatory trends in planning (Murdoch and Abram, 2002; 
Cowell and Murdoch, 1999). The UŶited KiŶgdoŵ͛s planning systems͛ foĐus on national housing 
numbers and 'targets' has been particularly criticised (Meen and Andrew, 2008; Whitehead, 1997). 
Population and household projections are a critical tool in holding together this framework of housing 
governance (Gallent and Tewdwr-Jones, 2007; Holmans, 2012). The role of projections in planning for 
housing is contested, especially in England (Holmans, 2013; Rees et al., 2015; McDonald and Williams, 
2014). Critiques of the use of household projections in planning –  trend-based population projections 
derived from demographic assumptions to indicate future household formation - paint a complex 
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picture. Some accounts highlight the constraining function of household projections in a hierarchical 
system of planning for housing where regional and local stakeholders have "very little scope for 
negotiation around the overall numbers" (Murdoch and Abram, 2002, p. 5). This view has persisted 
despite the recognised ͚ĐƌudeŶess͛ of national household projections (Gallent, 2007; Golland and 
Gillen, 2004). Government has argued that household pƌojeĐtioŶs aƌe ͚guideliŶes͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ 
͚taƌgets͛, Ǉet stakeholders report that the scope to challenge these ͚guideliŶes͛ is limited (Cowell and 
Murdoch, 1999). There are contrasting accounts that argue population and household projections are 
not so restrictive. Gallent and Tewdwr-Jones (2007, p. 152), for example, state that projections ͞lose 
much of their initial potency as they become just one factor among many". Planning systems in 
England and Wales have arguably become less top-down in character over the past decade 
(Allmendinger and Haughton, 2011). The machinery tying planners into a layered, hierarchical system 
of planning for housing has recently been dismantled, reinforcing a  trend towards the increasing 
localisation of planning for housing (Vigar et al, 2000; Valler et al, 2012; Gallent et al., 2013).  
This paper explores the role household projections play within localised and market-driven 
governance frameworks (Haughton and Allmendinger, 2014), and an environment increasingly 
characterised by high levels of ambiguity. There are several important sources of ambiguity, including 
the impact of economic recession on the role household projections play in identifying housing land 
requirements. We argue firstly that in an increasingly localised system, where government policy 
promotes local interpretation of household projections, there remains considerable uncertainty about 
local planning authorities͛ aďilitǇ to depart from household projections interpreted as 'housing 
targets'. The paper secondly argues that this uncertainty is compounded by the effect on household 
projections of financial crisis and economic recession, creating a high policy conflict environment. In 
doing so, we contribute to the policy implementation literature by exploring how change in policy 
ambiguity can result from a change in, and stakeholdeƌs͛ interpretation of, an externally derived 
referential goal. 
The paper introduces a conceptual framework for exploring ambiguity and conflict in policy 
implementation, followed by an account of changes in spatial governance focusing on the emergence 
of pro-market localism and political devolution (Haughton and Allmendinger, 2014). The paper then 
introduces household projections as a critical tool holding together spatial governance of housing, and 
identifies the implications of using household projections in a more localised system. The empirical 
sections identify how these various elements come together in a case study of plaŶŶeƌs͛ use of 
household projections in Wales. Key features of the case study include the ways that stakeholders 
interpret national planning policy, as well as how they navigate uncertainties created by a multiplicity 
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of alternative projections and economic recession. A concluding section identifies the wider lessons 
for planning for housing and policy implementation. 
Ambiguity and conflict in policy implementation 
Household projections act as a key, yet contested reference point when planning for housing. We 
draw on MatlaŶd͛s ;ϭϵϵϱͿ influential work on policy implementation in public administration to 
understand the role projections play in planning for housing, and how they are interpreted and acted 
upon in policy making processes. His ͚Ambiguity-Conflict in Policy Implementation͛ model has 
reframed debates on policy implementation in various fields, including social policy (Hudson, 2006; 
Ellis, 2015), economics (Arnaboldi and Lapsely, 2009), and education (Hordern, 2015; Bialik, Gibton, 
and Dror, 2016). Matland͛s work linked two key characteristics, ambiguity and conflict, which need to 
be analysed together to understand policy outcomes. MatlaŶd͛s ǁoƌk ĐhalleŶged the pƌeǀailiŶg 
assumption that policy ambiguity results in low levels of conflict as it allows flexibility in interpretation. 
He argued that it is possible for high levels of conflict to co-exist with high levels of policy ambiguity. 
The interaction between ambiguity and conflict varies depending on the situation, from high 
ambiguity/low conflict, low ambiguity/high conflict, high ambiguity/high conflict, and low 
ambiguity/low conflict. Matland (1995, 156) suggests policy conflict eǆists ͞ǁheŶ more than one 
organization sees a policy as directly relevant to its interests and when the organizations have 
incongruous views͟ and ͞ Disputes over policy means can develop over jurisdictional issues or over the 
suďstaŶĐe of the pƌoposed ŵeaŶs foƌ ƌeaĐhiŶg the goals͟. IŶ planning for housing, while the overall 
goal might be to deliver additional housing, local authorities, developers, and other stakeholders 
might disagree as to the amount of housing and its location. In contrast, policy ambiguity can be 
divided into ambiguity of goals and ambiguity of means. Ambiguity of goals results when there is 
confusion or uncertainty about the objective of a policy, while ambiguity of means results from 
uncertainty about the role of different groups in the implementation of policy, or when actors do not 
know ͞ǁhiĐh tools to use, hoǁ to use theŵ, aŶd ǁhat the effects of their use will be͟ ;MatlaŶd, 1995, 
158). Our case study below identifies household projections as a referential goal. Referential goals are 
those whose importance is interpreted differently by stakeholders as well as those directly involved 
in policy implementation, leading to conflicts of interpretation. 
Matland (1995) argues the role of professionals becomes more important when conflict exists, as they 
attempt to interpret the goal through their disciplinary lens. Conflict becomes even more pronounced 
when professionals of different backgrounds become involved, as there ͞aƌe likelǇ to ďe loŶg aŶd 
ďitteƌ͟ disagreements over how to interpret goals (Matland, 1995, 169). Matland argues these 
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disagreements are likely to be solved through coercion or bargaining, rather than problem solving or 
persuasion. 
High levels of ambiguity and conflict lead to varied outcomes as goals are interpreted by coalitions of 
varying strength, thereby localising and structuring the final outcome. In order to understand these 
processes ͞identifying the competing factions at the local level, along with the micro-level contextual 
factors that affect the strengths of competing factions, is central to accurate explanations of policy 
outcomes͟ (Matland, 1995, 170). The high ambiguity/high conflict pairing is not static and can shift 
throughout the policy implementation process (Ellis, 2015). Studies of policy implementation 
movement from one pairing to another are, however, limited. We explore through our case study the 
ways in which household projections are interpreted in local plan-making, the roles of professionals 
and other stakeholders, and the effect of national and local interventions to resolve ambiguity and 
reduce conflicting interpretations of household projections. The following contributes to an improved 
understanding of how such shifts occur through the actions of different actors in variable local 
contexts. The next section identifies recent changes in planning for housing in the UK that have 
resulted in greater levels of ambiguity and conflict as power has been decentralised. 
Changes in spatial governance 
Spatial planning͛s role in housing delivery is influenced by its wider governance context (Haughton et 
al, 2010). The planning systems in the UK gradually developed in the 1980s and 1990s into a system 
of performance monitoring and accountancy (Vigar et al. 2000). As a result, the lack of ambiguity 
provided by household projections became a nearly undisputable component of planning for housing. 
Government utilised numbers as an instrument to exercise power and cascade housing requirements 
from the national level to localities (Rose, 1991). Planning for housing became increasingly focused on 
household projections, with gradual refinement of the projections and their methods (Bate, 1999; 
Gallent, 2007; Gallent and Tewdwr-Jones, 2007). Recent changes in governance establish a basis for 
reassessing the key mechanisms used in planning for housing, and especially household projections. 
Haughton and Allmendinger͛s (2014) analysis of England identifies six phases of spatial governance 
between 1979 and 2010. They also identify a seventh, embryonic paradigm around pro-market 
localism, characterised by deregulation of controls, abolition of regional strategies and erosion of 
hierarchies and cascade functions (pp 14-18). Haughton and Allmendinger highlight several 
transformations driving spatial planning discourse in the UK, Europe and beyond. These include the 
reconfiguration of spatial planning to complement economic growth objectives, objectives intricately 
connected with housing supply. Allmendinger and Haughton (2010) also identify a burgeoning of new 
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planning spaces and practices, and new models for understanding spatial relationships. Alongside 
these changes in spatial governance, public policies have developed beyond the nation state, driven 
by economic interdependencies between countries and growing recognition of transnational 
problems (Knill and Tosun, 2012), as well as devolution of powers. This devolution and ͚hollowing out 
of the state͛ results in policy being developed closer to those directly affected (Richards and Smith, 
2002). Of course, ͞deǀolǀed goǀeƌŶŵeŶts do theiƌ oǁŶ thiŶg͟ ;Rhodes et al, 2003, p.165) leading to 
divergence in policy, involvement of different actors at different spatial scales, and across different 
policy spheres (Dorey, 2005). In addition, successive UK governments have pursued different policies 
to shape the powers of local government, the weight given to strategic regional planning, and the 
emphasis placed on localism (Haughton and Allmendinger, 2014). More localised policy making is 
claimed to have practical advantages, by developing policy networks and producing policies through 
participatory governance that better reflect the aspirations of local communities (Fung and Wright, 
2001). 
Planning in the UK is multi-scalar - plans and policies are developed by different bodies at different 
scales. Devolution to Wales in 1999 enabled the emergence of new territorial approaches to spatial 
planning, exemplified by the Wales Spatial Plan (Haughton et al, 2010). There has also been a 
renaissance of interest in regional scale governance, transcending local government boundaries 
(Morgan, 2007; Jessop et al, 2008). In Wales, city-regional spaces have emerged, emphasising 
collaborative approaches to policy. These developments resonate with Haughton et al͛s (2010) call to 
attend to ͚soft spaces and fuzzy boundaries͛ to complement the ͚hard spaces͛ of governmental 
activity. Planning for additional housing in response to projected household growth has adapted to fit 
within this framework of evolving spatial planning, political devolution, more local and inclusive policy 
making, and soft governance spaces. Various UK governments have for more than a decade been 
promoting growth strategies, including a key role for housing in supporting growth in the national and 
local economy (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2003). High-profile reviews have reinforced a 
focus on the delivery of additional housing, through identifying the barriers to delivery and arguing 
that the location of new housing should support economic development (Barker, 2004). Following the 
Barker Review in 2004 a shift towards an emphasis on housing affordability emerged resulting in a 
more explicit inclusion of market impacts into land-use planning for housing (Bramley, 2013), and an 
evolving role for household projections within this process. The skills needed within the built 
environment professions to support growth have also been explored (Egan, 2004). These various 
initiatives to deliver new housing were eǆploƌed iŶ teƌŵs of the ĐƌeatioŶ of ͚ sustaiŶaďle ĐoŵŵuŶities͛. 
However, promoting growth inevitably led to tensions between local communities over the extent of 
development, as well as resource constraints limiting additional housing supply. The economic 
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recession of 2007-8 may have reduced development conflicts on the ground yet, as shown in the next 
section, many of these issues persist.  
The role of household projections 
Household projections are a deterministic method for identifying housing land requirements. Their 
long-range, supposedly impartial, and technical character appeals to a traditional survey-analysis-plan 
mentality (Bramley, 2013). Gallent (2007) provides detailed explanation of the methodological 
principles underpinning household projections data. His analysis quickly reveals that they are based 
on assumptions that are vulnerable to considerable uncertainty, especially in key components of 
household projections data, such as population growth, household size, and migration (Barker, 2015; 
King, 2016). Migration and household formation are usually the source of greatest levels of variation 
due to limited data and sensitivity to short-term economic fluctuations (Nicol, 2002; Abadi et al., 
2010). Several factors also lead to a ͚circularity͛ of planning using household projections (Bramley and 
Watkins, 1996). The provision of housing land impacts on factors that influence the household 
projections, such as migration patterns (Nygaard, 2011). Additionally, household projections focus on 
future need derived from past trends and not current market demand, and so neglect some of the 
impacts of market adjustments, or changes in policy - such as interventions to improve housing 
affordability - that could alter household formation rates (Meen, 2011).  
These ͚ stƌategiĐ pƌoďleŵs͛ with household projections aƌe ĐoŵpouŶded ďǇ a seƌies of ͚ usual statistiĐal 
diffiĐulties͛, iŶĐludiŶg local disaggregation and projections over extended time-frames (Bate, 1999, p. 
370). Murdoch and Abram (2002) highlight the significance of trend planning to calculating household 
projections. The projections, put simply, are a projection of a recent trend into the future, a future 
assumed as a continuation of the past (Adams and Watkins, 2002). Consequently, changes in socio-
economic circumstances are not always reflected in the household projections (Baker and Wong, 
1997). Variables used in household projections are particularly sensitive to short-term economic 
fluctuations, meaning longer-term trends can be crowded out (Bate, 1999; Mykyta and Macartney, 
2010). Short-term economic fluctuations, when projected forwards, mean that ͞authorities are then 
uncertain whether shorter-term departures from trends are just blips or the start of a change in the 
tƌeŶd͟ ;Bate, ϭϵϵϵ, p. ϯϳϰͿ. This is important in our case study of Wales, in which considerable debate 
arises over how to interpret successive household projections post-recession. This echoes difficulties 
in England during the 1990s when household projections to inform regional planning guidance 
followed recession (Baker and Wong, 1997). 
7 
 
There is also a practical challenge when using household projections to prepare development plans. 
Statutory plan-making in England and Wales is characterised by long preparation times and patchy 
coverage of up-to-date plans (Barker, 2006). Yet population and household projections are issued at 
regular intervals of three to four years. Plans are typically prepared on longer timescales than the cycle 
of revised projections with the possibility of ͞ one set of projections being superseded by a more recent 
set whilst the plaŶ is ďeiŶg Đoŵpiled͟ ;NiĐol, ϮϬϬϮ, p. ϱϲͿ. This ĐaŶ lead to claims that a plan is based 
on out-of-date information, protracted debate at examination on the data used, and undermine the 
credibility of the plan (see Baker and Wong, 1997). The problems created by cycles of revision are 
compounded when the latest household projections are very different to preceding ones (Nicol, 
2002). Barker (2015) documented extreme variations at regional level in England of projected 
households over relatively short time-frames. This challenge features prominently in our research on 
Wales below. 
Household projections and localisation 
The calculation of household projections is a complex, statistical exercise. Calculating housing land 
requirements based on population and household projections is therefore sometimes cast as a 
'technical' and apolitical exercise. The planning system is nevertheless a framework for deliberation 
over future development, where the political confronts the technical (Cowell and Owens, 2006). 
Gallent and Tewdwr-JoŶes͛ ;ϮϬϬϳ) case studies of regional planning guidance in England highlight that 
'objective' trend-based household projections rapidly descend into subjective political debates about 
housing allocations. In contrast, Haughton et al͛s (2010) case study of the Wales Spatial Plan 
documents Welsh GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s reluctance to prescribe housing numbers to individual local 
authorities, preferring collaborative working with individual authorities to identify housing 
requirements. Haughton et al (2010, p. 150) concluded that, despite early stages of the process, 
͞GiǀeŶ its sŵalleƌ size aŶd the ŶatioŶal eŵphasis oŶ improving joint working across government 
agencies at all scales, this is something of a litmus test for how Wales can show that it can produce a 
distinctive policy regime͟ ;HaughtoŶ, et al.,ϮϬϭϬ, pϭϱϬͿ. A distinctive part of this regime is a localised, 
collaborative system of exploring household projections data when calculating housing land 
requirements. This section explores some of the issues arising from use of household projections in a 
localised system. 
The planning system provides a useful local forum for testing housing figures as household projections 
are given spatial form, made less ambiguous, and therefore more contestable (Murdoch and Abram, 
2002). Vigar et al͛s (2000, p. 112) case studies show that ͞ǁithiŶ the stƌoŶg stƌuĐtuƌiŶg of the housing 
land policy discourse and practices provided at the national level, there was significant variation in 
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loĐal iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ aŶd politiĐs͟. Theiƌ ƌeseaƌĐh suggests that the loĐalitǇ is an arena for challenging 
top-down discourses of planning for housing, although local oppositioŶ to ͚teĐhŶiĐal͛ figuƌes is 
soŵetiŵes laďelled as ͚eŵotioŶal͛ oƌ ďased oŶ ͚iŶteƌests͛ when expressed in formal arenas for testing 
plans (Cowell and Murdoch, 1999; Adams, 2011). 
A localised system that departs from a cascade system of housing numbers openly invites stakeholders 
to develop alternative projections. Previous studies demonstrate that developers submit wide 
variations on household projections and housing land requirements at development plan 
examinations, explained by political play as much as preference for different calculation methods 
(Murdoch and Abram, 2002; Vigar et al., 2000). Multiple projections by different stakeholders can 
pƌoǀe pƌoďleŵatiĐ as ͞data ĐaŶ ďe fouŶd to suppoƌt alŵost all ǀieǁs͟ (Nicol, 2002, p. 56). The 
variability of technical expertise and resources across local authorities also presents challenges, which 
may severely constrain the ability of localities to develop their own household projections (Murdoch 
and Abram, 2002). There are also concerns that local stakeholders may be poorly equipped to enter 
͚technical͛ debates on housing numbers (Cowell and Murdoch, 1999). The Welsh case study materials 
outlined below reveal the wide variation in figures, and how these are contested. 
Planning for housing is a complex arena where ͞the teĐhŶiĐal pƌoĐess ĐaŶ ďe hiddeŶ ďehiŶd politiĐal 
choiĐes͟ ;NiĐol, ϮϬϬϮ, p. 57). We also argue conversely that attempts are made to hide political choices 
behind supposedly technical calculations. This is evident in our case study of Wales. Essentially, given 
that technical matters are still influential in identifying housing land requirements, and carry 
significant weight in formal arenas for plan examination, political strategies are based on claims that 
later need to be supported by evidence. Scrutiny can then reveal that political strategies are 
unsupported by technical evidence (Vigar et al. 2000). We now relay our case study of the conflicts, 
ambiguities and challenges of using household projections data in a more localised and post-recession 
planning system. 
 
A case study of ambiguity and conflict in the use of household projections 
Debate on household projections͛ ƌole in planning practice has focused principally on England. Several 
factors explain this, including the extent of household change in England, and the role intermediary 
regional planning mechanisms previously played in directing housing onto localities (Pugalis and 
Townsend, 2013). There are nevertheless some accounts of planning for housing in Wales (Gallent 
and Tewdwr-Jones, 2007). Wales has its own planning policy context and an increasingly distinctive 
governance and legislative framework (Heley, 2013). Welsh Government provides strategic direction 
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for the planning system, including through its national planning policy document Planning Policy 
Wales. Twenty-five local planning authorities each prepare a Local Development Plan. Local 
development plans must quantify the amount of market and affordable housing needed for their area. 
Planning Policy Wales identifies a range of issues local planning authorities must consider and states 
'The latest Welsh Government local authority level Household Projections should form the starting 
point for assessing housing requirements' (Welsh Government, 2016). 
A unitary local government system means regional intermediaries for cascading housing numbers 
have been absent in Wales. Wales has not therefore witnessed the cascading of housing numbers that 
until recently characterised planning in England (Swain et al, 2013). Local planning authorities in Wales 
histoƌiĐallǇ ͚appoƌtioŶed͛ housiŶg ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts ǀia collaborative mechanisms, yet this work had 
limited status at plan inquiries. Apportionment has been abandoned and local planning authorities 
now prepare Local Development Plans using local authority level population and household 
projections. Recent changes nevertheless suggest increasing central direction over the planning 
system. A new National Development Framework to be prepared by Welsh Government, and Strategic 
Development Plans in parts of Wales, may play a future role in determining housing requirements. 
This could challenge the presently localised system of identifying housing requirements through Local 
Development Plans. 
This research draws on stakeholder interviews, a call for evidence, desk-based analysis of three case 
study areas, and a focus group. It included 11 semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, lasting 
approximately 45 minutes each, from divisions of Welsh Government, Local Planning Authorities, 
professional bodies and interest groups, The Planning Inspectorate, as well as planning consultancies. 
The project invited all 25 local planning authorities to submit evidence, producing 11 detailed 
responses, and collective responses from three National Park Authorities and five North Wales local 
planning authorities. This was complemented by three detailed Local Development Plan case studies, 
each including a study of examination libraries and complemented, where possible, by an interview 
with a senior planning officer. Finally, a focus group of six key stakeholders was convened to debate 
research findings1. 
The 2011-based household projections were in place when the research was conducted, and differed 
markedly from the 2008-based projections. The 2011-based data utilised more accurate data from the 
2011 Census, while the 2008-based household projections relied in part on the 2001 Census. More 
importantly for this study, the 2011-based projections were derived from a period of economic 
                                                             
1All interviewees, representations, and focus group participants gave permission for their comments 
to be used and attributed to their organisation in publications. 
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recession. Consequently, every local authority in Wales except for two showed a reduced household 
projection figure compared to the 2008-based projections, with over half seeing more than a 50% 
reduction in projected households (Welsh Government, 2010; 2014a). This created an uncertain 
environment in which to calculate housing requirements. As a result, Welsh Government issued a 
Policy Clarification Letter on use of the 2011-based household projections. Policy Clarification Letters 
are used to 'provide urgent clarification of policy or procedure issued by the Minister or Planning 
Division' (Welsh Government, 2014b, emphasis added), suggesting a role in managing ambiguity. The 
letter stated the 2011-based household projections had been 'significantly affected by recent past 
economic conditions resulting from the global economic crisis' and 'it is not prudent for a Plan, looking 
15-20 years ahead to replicate a period of exceptionally poor economic performance' (Welsh 
Government, 2014b, p. 1). The paper now explores how actors responded to this ambiguity, which 
evolved into a fuller discussion of the role of household projections data in identifying housing land 
requirements.  
 
Household projections ͚as a starting point͛ 
Welsh GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt plaŶŶiŶg poliĐǇ ideŶtifies household pƌojeĐtioŶs as the ͚staƌtiŶg poiŶt͛ foƌ 
assessing housing land requirements2. This section explores the considerable ambiguity and varying 
interpretations that stakeholders read into this statement. Welsh Government explained how its 
policy should be interpreted, arguing that while household pƌojeĐtioŶs pƌoǀide a ͚ staƌtiŶg poiŶt͛, plan-
makers had to consider other factors: 
 
͞theǇ͛ƌe a staƌtiŶg poiŶt…it͛s Ŷot a Đoŵplete ŵatheŵatiĐal, sĐieŶtifiĐ solutioŶ.…ďeĐause 
theǇ͛ƌe tƌeŶd ďased, ǁhateǀeƌ Ǉou͛ǀe aligŶed iŶ the past ǁill affeĐt theiƌ diƌeĐtioŶ iŶ the 
futuƌe. That͛s the Ŷatuƌe of aŶǇ pƌojeĐtioŶs͟. 
Welsh Government officers stated local planning authorities can depart from the household 
projections, and ͞ if a loĐal authoƌitǇ ǁishes to ŵoǀe aǁaǇ fƌoŵ those figuƌes, it has eǀideŶĐe to justifǇ 
that - Ǉou͛ǀe just got to eǆplaiŶ ǁhǇ͟. The crucial reference is to evidence to justify departure from 
                                                             
2 The research was completed in 2016 when Welsh Government planning policy identified 
that Welsh Government household projections foƌŵed a ͚staƌtiŶg poiŶt͛ foƌ ideŶtifǇiŶg 
housing land requirements. The phrasing of the policy was revised in 2017. The effect of the 
revision is – at least in policy terms – to further downgrade the significance of the 
household projections. The paper continues to reflect on the phrasing and interpretation of 
the policy at the time the research was conducted. 
11 
 
the projection. We later identify impediments to local planning authorities presenting this evidence. 
Welsh Government planners highlighted that household projections cannot substitute for effective 
planning: 
͞people get tƌaŶsfiǆed oŶ the pƌojeĐtioŶs, ǁhiĐh is, I thiŶk the ǁƌoŶg eŶd of the stiĐk to staƌt 
with…plaŶŶiŶg is…aďout kŶoǁiŶg ǁheƌe Ǉou ǁaŶt to get to aŶd ǁhǇ, aŶd theŶ Ŷuŵďeƌs 
follow that͟ 
Private sector planning consultants endorsed Welsh GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ. One local planneƌ͛s 
views also aligned ĐloselǇ ǁith the Welsh GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s argument – echoing also Whitehead and 
Williams͛ ;ϮϬϭϭͿ positioŶ oŶ the desiƌaďilitǇ of past tƌeŶds - that trend-based projections inform, but 
do not substitute for, effective planning: 
͞[theǇ͛ƌe] short term, trend-ďased pƌojeĐtioŶs. “o, Ǉou͛ǀe got to deĐide as aŶ authoƌitǇ at 
the staƌt ǁhetheƌ oƌ Ŷot Ǉou͛ƌe pƌepaƌed to ďase loŶg-teƌŵ plaŶŶiŶg oŶ shoƌt teƌŵ tƌeŶds… 
Past policies might influence the trend, but that past policy might not be what you want to 
do iŶ the futuƌe͟ [loĐal plaŶŶiŶg authoƌitǇ A] 
The Planning Inspectorate closely echoed this point, stressing the importance of the household 
projections as a referential point, but also the possibility that planning authorities can depart from the 
figures: 
 
͞eǀeƌǇthiŶg is doŶe iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of theiƌ household pƌojections, but if a local authority has 
gone away and done a robust piece of work looking at that figure, coming up with different 
alternative options and choosing the one it considers the most appropriate, that is what 
ǁould ĐaƌƌǇ ŵoƌe ǁeight ďeĐause it͛s a refinement of the oƌigiŶal pƌojeĐtioŶ͟ 
Some interviewees identified limitations to Welsh GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s poliĐǇ. A ĐoŶsultaŶt aƌgued that 
͞theƌe isŶ͛t a stƌiĐt leǀel of guidaŶĐe theƌe, otheƌ thaŶ saǇiŶg it͛s a staƌtiŶg poiŶt͟. He recognised 
͞[poliĐǇ] doesŶ͛t Ŷeed to ďe oǀeƌlǇ pƌesĐƌiptiǀe͟, but planning policy could usefully set out how to 
ŵoǀe ďeǇoŶd the ͚staƌtiŶg poiŶt͛ of household projections, including how to develop variant 
projections and alternative scenarios [planning consultant B]. This is evidence of a call for additional 
guidance to resolve ambiguity in how to identify a housing land requirement. The Planning 
Inspectorate also identified potential for poliĐǇ to elaďoƌate oŶ stages afteƌ the ͚staƌtiŶg poiŶt͛: 
͞TheŶ ǁhat happeŶs afteƌ that? That͛s I suppose ǁheƌe the vagueness might come in. 
MaǇďe ǀague isŶ͛t the ƌight ǁoƌd, ďut Ŷeǀeƌtheless…it͛s pƌoďaďlǇ tƌue that theƌe is Ƌuite a 
bit of scope for authorities to determine how they should adjust foƌ household pƌojeĐtioŶs͟ 
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One Welsh Government planner defended the policy against the accusation of lack of clarity, arguing 
that ͞I do struggle to see how much more blunt you have to be. I do struggle when people say they 
doŶ͛t uŶdeƌstaŶd ǁhat they think they need to do͟. An opposing view is that the household 
projections are pƌesĐƌiptiǀe, aŶd that theǇ effeĐtiǀelǇ pƌeseŶt a ͚housiŶg ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶt͛. One local 
planner explained how household projections were interpreted: 
͞it͛s Ŷot ŶeĐessaƌilǇ the staƌtiŶg poiŶt, it͛s kiŶd of the ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶt. Welsh Government 
provide guidance and a strong suggestion as to what direction we should be going in. The 
iŵpƌessioŶ ǁe had ǁas that it͛s ŵoƌe than a starting point it, was more of a requirement͟ 
[local planning authority B]. 
One explanation for local planners interpreting household projections as a housing requirement is 
they do not have the skills and expertise to interpret and refine household projections data: 
 
͞a lot of loĐal authoƌities doŶ͛t haǀe the teĐhŶiĐal eǆpeƌtise to pƌoduĐe theiƌ oǁŶ 
pƌojeĐtioŶs. TheǇ͛ǀe eitheƌ takeŶ the pƌojeĐtioŶs aŶd just used theŵ ďeĐause theǇ haǀeŶ͛t 
got the iŶteƌŶal ĐapaďilitǇ to ŵaŶipulate the figuƌes, aŶd theǇ doŶ͛t ŶeĐessaƌilǇ uŶderstand 
the figures.͟ [LPA A] 
PlaŶŶiŶg ĐoŶsultaŶts also Ŷoted the deĐliŶe iŶ loĐal plaŶŶiŶg authoƌities͛ in-house capacity to model 
population data – driven by local government reform and exacerbated by declining resources - and 
that consultants were increasingly used for input. External expertise is useful, yet has disadvantages 
over in-house expertise. In-house expertise allows development of multiple, iterative options and 
scenarios, and encourages greater local ͚ownership͛ of a plan. The absence of in-house expertise also 
raised concerns about local planning authorities defending their plans as ͞you need to understand 
ǁhat it is that͛s ďeeŶ doŶe, it ĐaŶ͛t just ďe a ďlaĐk ďoǆ͟ [LPA A]. The absence of in-house expertise was 
therefore recognised as restricting the capaĐitǇ to ͚fight the figuƌes͛, and constrained a more localised 
approach to identifying housing requirements. A lack of in-house expertise also undermined local 




Pro-market localism and political conflict 
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͞HousiŶg Ŷuŵďers…, partiĐularly at a loĐal level, are ĐoŶteŶtious thiŶgs, hugely ĐoŶteŶtious 
things. Planning is almost the most intensely political issue that councillors get iŶvolved iŶ͟ 
[housing association] 
The allocation of housing land is often controversial, aŶd ĐaŶ lead to ƌesideŶts͛ oďjeĐtioŶs. These 
conflicts play out in the plan-making process. The ͚ politiĐallǇ Ŷeutƌal͛ household projections encounter 
local political challenge as abstract figures translate into a local housing requirement. Some 
authoƌities haǀe ͚goŶe ďliŶdlǇ ǁith the pƌojeĐtioŶs͛, perhaps as a result of lack of skills, yet most 
challenge the headline projections. All actors recognised the legitimacy of local politics in planning for 
housing, recognising that housing land provisioŶ ͞ǁill Đoŵe doǁŶ to politiĐal deĐisioŶs aďout ĐeƌtaiŶ 
impacts of various levels of growth on particular parts of aŶ authoƌitǇ͛s aƌea͟ [PlaŶŶiŶg IŶspeĐtoƌate]. 
Yet while stakeholders recognise a legitimate role for local politics and bargaining, they also support 
a rational, evidence-based plan-making process. Planning consultants argued that local planning 
authorities typically underprovide housing in draft plans as part of a ͚housiŶg Ŷuŵďeƌs gaŵe͛: 
͞developers want the right number and they want a robust number, and they are generally 
concerned that the first cut of numbers coming out is often neither of those things, its often 
too low, its ofteŶ ďased oŶ eǀideŶĐe ǁhiĐh…is ďaĐk filliŶg to get to aŶ aŶsǁeƌ͟ [plaŶŶiŶg 
consultant A] 
Welsh Government also criticised ͚ďaĐk-filliŶg͛ of evidence, when a local planning authority has 
͞chosen a number and then had to try and retrofit it͟. One local planner noted how earlier household 
projections had driven ͞a ƌeallǇ huge step ĐhaŶge iŶ the aŵouŶt of deǀelopŵeŶt that ǁas goiŶg to ďe 
allowed for͟ [loĐal plaŶŶiŶg authoƌitǇ C]. The scale of change lead to a defensive position, opening 
with a housing figure significantly below the household projections on the premise that the scale of 
deǀelopŵeŶt ĐaŶŶot ďe aĐĐoŵŵodated ǁithiŶ the aƌea͛s eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal ĐoŶstƌaiŶts. Welsh 
GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt eĐhoed the aďoǀe ĐoŶsultaŶt͛s ĐƌitiĐisŵs: 
͞I thiŶk it͛s eitheƌ theiƌ iŶaďility professionally to do what they should be doing, or they are 
struggling to justify a political outcome that they are trying to achieve as an authority that 
ĐaŶ͛t ďe aĐhieǀed͟ 
The Welsh Government planner went on to defend the planning system against criticisms directed at 
the plan-making process or the household projections: 
͞at the eŶd of the daǇ it ŵeaŶs hoŵes, it ŵeaŶs hoŵes oŶ the gƌouŶd. AŶd it ŵeaŶs that 
soŵe people ǁoŶ͛t like ǁheƌe theǇ go, aŶd I thiŶk that͛s the fuŶdaŵeŶtal issue. It͛s Ŷot the 
LDP pƌoĐess…, aŶd it͛s Ŷot the pƌojeĐtioŶs. The issue is people doŶ͛t like the outĐoŵe͟ 
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Planning consultants also warned of local planning authorities trying to ͚politiĐise͛ theiƌ ƌeseaƌĐh if it 
did Ŷot suppoƌt the loĐal plaŶŶiŶg authoƌitǇ͛s positioŶ or ambition to suppress the amount of housing 
provided in the plan. Consultants, developers and the Welsh Government also registered concerns 
about draft plans expressing ambitions for economic growth, without aligning that growth with 
housing provision: 
͞theƌe is foƌ faƌ too loŶg ͚a joďs aƌe good, houses aƌe ďad͛ situatioŶ goiŶg oŶ ƌight aĐƌoss the 
ĐouŶtƌǇ, ǁheƌeďǇ people saǇ ͚Ǉeah, ǁe ǁaŶt to Đƌeate joďs, that͛s gƌeat, ďut ǁe doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ 
ǁaŶt the houses that goes ǁith that͛… [ĐouŶĐilloƌs] aƌe Ŷot goiŶg to vote for some more 
houses to go up…aŶd it puts the plaŶ iŶ a ǀeƌǇ diffiĐult positioŶ͟ [planning consultant A] 
This illustrates a failure of localised governance arrangements to deliver development to support their 
communities. The risk is that plans are set up to fail, especially if there is limited evidence to support 
an alternative strategy, with serious consequences at plan examination stage. One developer 
acknowledged that ͞the politiĐal ƌealitǇ is if [loĐal plaŶŶiŶg authoƌities] doŶ͛t like the Ŷuŵďeƌs - you 
kŶoǁ it͛s a faĐt of life - if Ǉou doŶ͛t like the result you generally go out and try to find a better way of 
Ǉouƌ oǁŶ͟ [housiŶg assoĐiatioŶ]. The challenge is whether the resources and skills are available to 
justify a different outcome. 
 
Recession, trend-planning and policy-driven ambiguity 
Household projections are trend-based and reflect the preceding five-year period. To simply accept 
the projections is to plan for the future as a continuation of the past. The 2011-based household 
projections reflect a period of mixed economic fortunes, with economic recession reflected in the 
projected trend. Planning for housing has been complicated by varying interpretation of the effects of 
recession on the projections, with debate over whether household projections are a sound basis for 
calculating housing land requirements. One planning officer recounted: 
͞ǁheŶ ǁe had the ϮϬϬϴ pƌojeĐtioŶs theǇ ǁeƌe ǀeƌy high because they were based on a 
period of economic boom, and then obviously when we had the 2011 based projections, 
they were very low because they were based on a period of decline [local planning authority 
A]͟ 
Local planners noted the challenges created for plan-making by significant variations in successive 
household projections. They argued that Welsh Government presented the higher 2008-based 
projections as a starting point from which there would need to be strong justification to depart from. 
15 
 
Many local planning authorities therefore planned for high levels of projected household growth. 
Councils that planned positively for this Ŷoǁ felt ͞peŶalised foƌ haǀiŶg those ƌeallǇ high figuƌes iŶ the 
plan; we are getting quite a lot of grief from local residents and our [elected] members ďeĐause…ŵoƌe 
recent projections are ŵuĐh, ŵuĐh loǁeƌ͟ [loĐal plaŶŶiŶg authoƌitǇ B]. The reactions of some local 
planning authorities to the lower projections also prompted concerns from housebuilders: 
͞ǁe saǁ aŶ eǆaŵple…ǁithiŶ a Đouple of ǁeeks of the figuƌes ĐoŵiŶg out, [the offiĐeƌs] 
took a report to committee looking to reduce the [housing requirement] figure by just over 
Ϯ,ϬϬϬ houses…it ǁas,…that knee jerk reactioŶ to the data ĐoŵiŶg out͟ [housebuilding 
representative] 
Welsh Government responded and tried to clarify the role of the recession-affected household 
projections, which acknowledges the significant ambiguity that the revised projections had created. 
The clarification, ironically, resulted in many stakeholders interpreting it as a revision of Welsh 
Government planning policy and creating further ambiguity. One local planner stated ͞I ǁouldŶ͛t saǇ 
[the Welsh GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt ĐlaƌifiĐatioŶ letteƌ] has ĐoŶfused ŵatteƌs, ďut it͛s ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ ƌaised aŶotheƌ  
diŵeŶsioŶ to the adǀiĐe͟ [loĐal plaŶŶiŶg authoƌitǇ C]. One local planner captured what he saw as 
GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s revised policy stance: 
͞Theƌe ǁas defiŶitelǇ a ǀieǁ takeŶ that ǁheŶ the [2008] principal projections were high…we 
were being encouraged [by Welsh Government] to ensure we had sufficient land to meet 
that level of growth. But the minute the 2011 projections come out we were being 
encouraged to ensure that we only used the population projections as a staƌtiŶg poiŶt͟ [LPA 
A] 
The housebuilding industry also commented critically on the  ĐlaƌifiĐatioŶ letteƌ, askiŶg ͞ǁhat͛s the 
poiŶt of pƌoduĐiŶg a set of ŶatioŶallǇ aĐĐepted figuƌes aŶd theŶ saǇiŶg ͚aĐtuallǇ, theǇ͛ƌe soƌt of Ŷot 
worth the papeƌ theǇ͛ƌe ǁƌitteŶ oŶ͛?͟. These debates highlight the extent to which stakeholders focus 
on any perceptible changes in Government position. They also highlight the challenges of using trend-
based projections, particularly when significant economic events impact on the period the trend is 
based upon. A Welsh Government officer reinforced the importance of local interpretation of 
household projections, arguing that: 
͞I͛d ŵuĐh ƌatheƌ people plaŶ foƌ the plaĐe ƌatheƌ thaŶ plaŶ foƌ the pƌojeĐtioŶ…because [if] 
Ǉou͛ƌe ĐhasiŶg a fluĐtuatiŶg pƌojeĐtioŶ Ǉou ǁill eŶd up ǁith soŵe ƌeallǇ stƌaŶge ƌesults͟ 
This exhortation – to ͚ plaŶ foƌ the plaĐe aŶd Ŷot the pƌojeĐtioŶ͛ – is unlikely to diminish the importance 




Examination – resolving ambiguity and conflict 
Local Development Plans are subject to independent examination. The examination is a critical arena 
for understanding the role of household projections as the examination ͚tests͛ a plaŶ͛s ĐoŶteŶt aŶd 
evidence base. Early stages of examination usually include discussion of planned housing figures, 
involving detailed examination of household projections data and other evidence. The processes at 
examination are an important determinant of the relative weight of vertical or localised governance 
arrangements. Some interviewees noted the value of examination in questioning the coherence of a 
plaŶ͛s stƌategǇ: 
͞the good thiŶg aďout the Local Development Plan process is that it makes everything 
tƌaŶspaƌeŶt…If theƌe aƌe teŶsioŶs ǁithiŶ ǁhat Ǉou͛ƌe tƌǇiŶg to do, those aƌe eǆposed, theŶ 
if you ĐaŶ͛t eǆplaiŶ ǁhǇ Ǉou͛ǀe ŵade those ĐhoiĐes,…that͛s usually when the wheels start to 
fall off…͟ [Welsh Government] 
Welsh Government also argued that plan examination is an opportunity to ask ͚ďasiĐ ƋuestioŶs͛ aďout 
housing and growth, such as ͚why are you going for a very aspirational outcome of the plan, when it 
plaŶs foƌ ǀeƌǇ loǁ populatioŶ gƌoǁth?͛͟. Planning consultants and housebuilders also identified the 
value of Welsh Government asking ͚ďasiĐ ƋuestioŶs͛ of loĐal plaŶŶiŶg authoƌities. Housebuilders 
iŶteƌpƌeted this as Welsh GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt ͞suppoƌt[iŶg] us iŶ the seŶse that theǇ also ƋuestioŶ the 
housiŶg Ŷuŵďeƌ, aŶd ǁe͛ǀe seeŶ it iŶ the past ǁheƌe theǇ͛ǀe goŶe ďaĐk to loĐal authoƌities aŶd said, 
you know, you need to aim for a higher housing figure͟. Other interviewees dissented from the view 
that examination was always an effective vehicle for discussing housing land requirements, as 
discussions on housing figures become particularly complex. One planner commented: 
͞theƌe ǁas a lot of tiŵe speŶt oŶ disĐussiŶg household pƌojeĐtioŶs…the Home Builders 
Federation were arguing for higher housing requirements based on household 
pƌojeĐtioŶs…the argument can get so technical that it is very, very difficult for inspectors to 
take an informed view really. I think 90% of the people in the room are probably struggling 
to folloǁ it͟ [LPA C] 
A multiplicity of different housing figures being presented by developers at examination similarly 
created opportunity to exploit the process: 
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͞developer A is saying this and developer B is saying that and developer C is saying this, and 
theǇ͛ƌe just all oǀeƌ the plaĐe, theŶ a loĐal authoƌitǇ ǁill exploit that, those cracks and say, 
ǁell theǇ doŶ͛t kŶoǁ so ĐleaƌlǇ ǁe͛ƌe ƌight͟ [planning consultant A] 
The examination is then characterised by a high degree of conflict, yet needs to resolve this ambiguity 
and conflict in approving a plan. Multiple housing requirement figures -  a product of a more localised 
system open to a wider range of actors - can lead to original household projection figures taking on 
greater significance than aŶ iŶteŶded ͚staƌtiŶg poiŶt͛. Inspectors often revert to the household 
projections by default as there are so many different interpretations of what level of housing is 
required. A consultant portrayed the examination as an intrinsically uncertain process: 
͞Ǉou doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ǁhat aŶ iŶspeĐtoƌ ǁill Đoŵe out ǁith…Ǉou͛ǀe got a number of competing 
Ŷuŵďeƌs ďeiŶg kiĐked aƌouŶd, the ĐouŶĐil͛s aŶd the deǀelopeƌs͛, aŶd ofteŶ the deǀelopeƌs 
aƌeŶ͛t speakiŶg ǁith oŶe ǀoiĐe. Therefore, Ǉou doŶ͛t Ƌuite kŶoǁ ǁhat aŶ iŶspeĐtoƌ ǁill saǇ, 
so that leads to uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ͟ [plaŶŶiŶg Đonsultant A] 
These uncertainties create circumstances where the official household projections figure takes on 
considerable significance in the eventual figure accepted at examination. If participants cannot 
through localised governance arrangements reach an evidence-based consensus on what housing 
ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts aƌe, theŶ little pƌogƌess is ŵade ďeǇoŶd the ͚staƌtiŶg poiŶt͛ of the household 
projections. The starting point becomes the end point, and negates the intentions underpinning a 
more localised system. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Changes in the governance landscape for planning and the eĐoŶoŵǇ͛s emergence from recession 
provide a basis for reassessing household projections as a critical policy tool of centralised control 
over housing delivery. The use of household projections in planning for housing has shifted from a low 
ambiguity/high conflict environment towards a more localised and market-oriented focus on housing 
supply and demand (Matland, 1995; Bramley, 2013). This has been facilitated by an increase in policy 
ambiguity linked to other contextual factors that increase ambiguity in interpreting that policy, and 
diminution of the policy significance of household projections in identifying housing land 
requirements in development plans in England and Wales. This is evidenced by the research and other 
accounts (Gallent and Tewdwr-Jones, 2007, p.152). UsiŶg MatlaŶd͛s ;ϭϵϵϱ, p. 168) argument, the 
increasing ambiguity of planning policy on household projections could be seen as an intended means 
of managing or diminishing the conflict that typically arises over housing numbers. The way that the 
policy is framed, and the ambiguity read by stakeholders into that framing, does however result in 
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ǁhat MatlaŶd aŶtiĐipated as ͞a pƌolifeƌatioŶ of iŶteƌpƌetatioŶs͟ ;p. ϭϲϴͿ. Household pƌojeĐtioŶs 
nevertheless remain a key feature of plan-making due to the simplistic familiarity they hold for 
planners and decision-makers. This highlights that even as central policy ambiguity rises local actors 
attempt to frame policy implementation debates in previous low ambiguity terms – that is, the 
pƌojeĐtioŶs aƌe ͚taƌgets͛ aŶd ŵust ďe ŵet - in an attempt to convince others of their given 
interpretation. Matland (1995, p. 168) identified too that symbolic policies in cases of high policy 
ambiguity and high policy conflict could either confirm new goals or reaffirm commitments to old 
goals. The apparent shift from a top-down and formal role for household projections as ͚housiŶg 
taƌgets͛, towards a more ambiguous ͚starting poiŶt͛ foƌ identifying housing requirements within a 
localised system, presents a series of tensions which are not, at least within our case study of Wales, 
entirely resolved.  
The use of household projections in planning for housing has been criticised for its emphasis on trend-
based planning and lack of engagement with economic factors which may not align to current needs 
or future plans (Murdoch and Abram, 2002; Adams, 2011). The Welsh case study highlights the danger 
of planning based on past trends and the difficulties that arise when drastically different household 
projections supersede previous ones, particularly during the plan-making process. In this case 
ambiguity initially increased due to the publication of updated household projections, rather than any 
change in top-down government policy resulting in goal ambiguity. This adds a new dimension to 
MatlaŶd͛s aŵďiguitǇ ĐoŶfliĐt matrix, as the shift from one pairing to another occurred not through 
policy change but an external factor that acted as a key referential goal. This has wider implications 
for the use of household projections in planning for housing within a plan-led system. The lack of 
sensitivity to policy changes and the intentions of local plans must be addressed. Local plans risk 
failure, for example, if the household projections based on past trends do not align to the plaŶ͛s 
ambitions for employment growth. Our interviewees were aware of the limitations of household 
projections, yet political and other pressures risked dictating the use of household projections to 
restrict housing growth that resulted in a disconnection between projections and plan. This 
highlighted further ambiguity of means as actors struggled to understand how best to use the revised 
household projections and their effects on their local plans. The fact that this was a common concern 
at plan examination highlights the tension between using household pƌojeĐtioŶs as a ͚staƌtiŶg poiŶt͛ 
and the potential manipulation of them for other means. 
The implementation of a more localised system, within a policy environment more open to 
interpretation and where localised variants are actively encouraged, also creates space for greater 
'testing' of household projections data. This allows for greater levels of customisation, consideration 
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of local context, and potentially better fit between plan and housing provision, however it also can 
result in conflict when different stakeholders bring forward multiple household projections forward. 
As similarly argued by Baker and Wong (1997) for strategic housing land allocations, in local instances 
it also becomes important for the calculation of projections and the assumptions that lie behind them 
to be transparent and evidenced. This may however lead to a range of subjective and competing 
arguments about what is a valid and appropriately evidenced methodology for household projection 
calculation, and what forms of data are best to be relied on aŶd lead to those ͚ loŶg aŶd ďitteƌ͛ deďates 
amongst professionals that Matland (1995, p. 169) anticipated. This distorts the idealised image of the 
rational, technical process of household projections as a means of identifying housing demand as they 
are increasingly localised and contested. 
Localisation of housing provision and an eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt of ĐoŶtestatioŶ feeds iŶto the ͚housiŶg 
Ŷuŵďeƌs͛ gaŵe. BaĐked ďǇ a poliĐǇ that alloǁs the iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of alteƌŶatiǀe pƌojeĐtions and 
considerations planners, politicians, developers, and other stakeholders often develop positions and 
define an approach that supports the housing number they desire for inclusion in the local plan, but 
also with an awareness that such a figure will likely be contested regardless of the evidence provided. 
This incentivises the stakeholders in the process to typically choose housing numbers that are more 
extreme with the realisation that their competing interests will ultimately be moderated by the 
arguments put forward by others. The introduction of vastly different household projections resulted 
in further local emphasis on coercion and bargaining over problem solving or persuasion. In this 
environment official household projections often play a key role as a baseline from which the process 
is regulated. In an age of austerity local authorities are increasingly at a disadvantage in challenging 
housing numbers due to lack of resources and talent to develop alternative projections (Hastings et 
al., 2015). Emaciated local planning authorities must become increasingly innovative (Fuller, 2017) or 
risk falling back on official household projections. 
Debates around the validity of varied localised household projections play out during plan 
preparation, however our research identifies a tendency for inspectors to ͚fall ďaĐk͛ oŶ offiĐial 
household projections when consensus has not been achieved on housing figures. The prominence 
given to this deterministic rationality negates efforts towards a more decentralised approach to 
planning for housing. As a result, the previous low ambiguity framework continues to hold sway in the 
policy implementation process despite efforts to shift it towards a high ambiguity environment. While 
perhaps more locally contested, the use of household projections in identifying housing requirements 
has partially maintained the traditional predict-and-provide role identified decades ago. Household 
projections therefore continue to hold greater sway during the development and examination of local 
20 
 
plans than is warranted. Matland (1995, p. 171) argues that ambiguity should not necessarily be seen 
as a flaw of central policy, and could be read as an empowerment of local interests responsible for 
implementation of that policy. A key motivation for Matland developing his framework was to 
overcome the top-down/bottom-up models of policy implementation. Nevertheless, his framework 
acknowledges that the distinctions of those models do remain important. The critical challenge, to 
folloǁ MatlaŶd͛s aƌguŵeŶt, is to foƌge suffiĐieŶtlǇ stƌoŶg loĐal ĐoalitioŶs that ĐaŶ work within the 
policy framed in more ambiguous terms by central government, or a policy that is made more 
ambiguous by contextual factors such as economic recession, and find ways of working through the 
conflict between different parties. We identified in the empirical material some evidence that 
developers saw the value of forming coalitions and collaborating on housing numbers, yet had not 
always managed this successfully. Similarly, we also found that skills and resources within local 
planning authorities were often not sufficient to respond to a wide range of differing interpretations 
over housing requirements. Policy outcomes in high conflict and high ambiguity contexts, Matland 
(1995, p. 168) stated, ǁill ďe ͞deteƌŵiŶed ďǇ the ĐoalitioŶ of aĐtoƌs at the loĐal leǀel ǁho ĐoŶtƌol the 
aǀailaďle ƌesouƌĐes͟. Ultimately, this research highlights not only the ambiguity in policy itself and its 
impacts on implementation, but also the previously unexplored importance of referential goals in 
policy implementation that are outside of direct government control, and how they act as a key 
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